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The Effect of Easing Monetary Policy in Regional 
Lending Markets in Japan 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the factors that support a funding demand increase 
in regional economies under easing monetary conditions. The following 
results were empirically obtained on the basis of individual firms and the 
47 regional data in the 2000s in Japan. The first result is that funding 
demand regionally increases where the relative size of private capital stock 
is large. This result suggests that industrial agglomeration complements 
easing monetary policy to induce regional funding demand. The second 
result is that regional banking soundness in lending markets also 
contributes to an increase in the funding demand. This suggests that 
another possible requirement of the money suppliers must be fulfilled to 
induce the regional funding demand.  
 
JEL Classification Code: R11, R12, G21 
Keywords: Regional Policy, Regional Banking Market, Monetary Policy 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 In Japan, a zero interest rate and quantitative easing monetary 
policy continued for the five-year period spanning 2001–2005. This policy 
was lifted in 2005 when the Japanese economy showed signs of recovery, 
but, as of March 2009, the policy interest rate has again declined to zero 
percent. A concern relating to this policy that researchers were unable to 
solve during the previous zero interest rate period is: what policy measures 
should be employed when monetary easing does not induce the funding 
demand? Overcoming this “liquidity trap” was a very important task for 
the Japanese economy policy makers in the first half of the 2000s. In fact, 
overcoming the liquidity trap has been a common policy concern across all 
major industrialized countries since 2008. 
 In Japan, the zero interest rate economy has continued for 
long-term period, and participants of the Japanese financial market regard 
this as a stationary state. The reason being that the corporate funding 
demand shows little signs of recovery even under an extreme easing 
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monetary policy that has continued for a long-term period. Domestic bank 
restructuring and dramatic structural changes of the financial industry, 
which began in 1998, also support the stationary state view. Coupled with 
the direct financing trend of the borrowers, the loan–deposit ratio of the 
regional banks was pushed down to a 60%–70% level, which is a 20% 
decrease from the loan–deposit level in 1988. 
 Over the last 30 years, it has become common for regional banks in 
Japan to absorb household savings in each regional deposit market toward 
concluding commercial lending contracts with firms in three important 
cities (i.e., Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya). Therefore, as the number of direct 
financing firms in these important cities increase, the regional banks need 
to find new clients. As a result, the regional banks have been trying to find 
new borrowers in local markets and enhance their relationship with 
potential clients. Unfortunately, over the last ten years, regional funding 
demand has slumped due to the above banking restructuring processes. 
This paper sought to discover a common non-financial regional factor that 
promotes funding demand in any given region by using data from the 47 
prefectures of Japan over the past several years in the current low interest 
rate economy. 
 The hypotheses that this paper examined are as follows. The first is 
that we hypothesize the transmission process of easing monetary policy 
varies depending on relative size of the private capital stock in any given 
region. The second, as the prominent existing literature suggests, is that 
funding demands in the regions where there are many manufacturers are 
likely to be stimulated by a cut in interest rates. We regard that the above 
two hypotheses as regional factors of the money-demand side. The regional 
factors of the supply-side are also important. Three additional hypotheses 
are the stability and competitiveness of the regional banking sectors. We 
propose the above financial supply-side requirements are necessary to 
induce the funding demand of non-financial firms. 
 This paper is divided into six sections. The first is the introduction 
section. In the next section, we review literature relating to our hypotheses 
and show how this paper contributes to the existing body of literature. In 
section three, we explain our hypothesis, empirical models, and our 
approach for analyzing and verifying the data. Section four explains how 
we obtained our data. In section five, we provide three sets of empirical 
results based on the methodologies as explained in section three. Finally, in 
section six we derive our conclusion from the empirical results detailed in 
section five. 
 
2.  Background and Existing Literature 
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 There is a vast amount of literature discussing the relationship 
between financial intermediation and the transmission process of monetary 
policy. Garrison and Chang (1979), Toal (1977), Beare (1976), and Garrison 
and Kort (1983) have focused their research on the relationship between 
regional economy and monetary policy2. On the other hand, the amount of 
literature that treats the relationship between regional diversification of 
banking markets and the transmission process of monetary policy is not 
large. Among a small number of these research papers, there is agreement 
that the following three regional factors are engines of the regional funding 
demand: 1) the interest elasticity of funding demand for firms, 2) the ratio 
of manufacturing firms and small to medium sized enterprises, and 3) the 
stability of the regional banking sector. 
 
A.  Interest Elasticity of Funding Demand in a Given Region 
 
 As Carlino and Defina (1998)(1999) pointed out, many researchers 
have found that high-interest elasticity of funding demand is an important 
regional factor that stimulates funding demand in the economy. In other 
words, some firms are stimulated by a cut in interest rates, but others are 
not. Therefore, the number of interest-elastic firms was a key to activating 
easing monetary policy and depended on the interest elasticity of funding 
demand. 
 The recent trends of regional fixed asset investment have become 
increasingly polarized over the last twenty years. Firms in Tokyo and the 
neighboring prefectures actively increased investment, and consequently, 
private capital stock strongly increased. Funding demand for those 
investments were also very strong in the Tokyo area. On the other hand, 
firms in prefectures where there is a smaller population and where fewer 
industrial agglomerations were made found it very difficult to induce the 
funding demand. Therefore, in case of regional economies within Japan, the 
interest elasticity of funding demand and regional industrial agglomeration 
seem to be correlated. 
 In the mid-1990s, Carlino and DeFina (1995) employed vector 
autoregression (VAR) in their empirical analysis. Since then, this 
methodology has become the main econometric model used in the field of 
economics. One of the merits of this methodology is that it enables 
researchers to examine causalities among variables. Fratantoni and Schuh 
(2003), Owyang and Wall (2005), and Schunk (2004) employed Carlino and 
DeFina’s (1995) VAR model to examine the regional transmission 
                                                  
2 These literatures respectively examined eight regions of the United States and derived 
implications how the transmission of easing monetary policy by Federal Reserve Board 
were diversified across the regions. 
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mechanism. Carlino and DeFina (1998, 1999) had also developed their 
previous studies by estimating the regional transmission magnitudes. 
 The implications from Carlino and Defina’s (1998)(1999) work can 
help us to understand what is happening in Japan. According to Carlino 
and Defina, the funding demand of interest rate elasticity depends on the 
formation of industrial agglomeration. If regional industrial policy has been 
successful in the region, the accumulated private capital stock will be 
relatively large and there will also be many supporting industries there. In 
these regions, as bank lending rates lower, it will likely induce the funding 
demand of the regional firms. 
 
B. Ratio of Manufacturing Firms and SMEs in the Region 
 
 The existing literature indicates that the ratio of manufacturing 
firms and small to medium enterprises (SMEs) to the total number of firms 
in a region also influences the regional funding demand. This is due to the 
managerial information of large firms being relatively transparent, as it is 
an accountability requirement for investors. As a result, there are various 
funding methodologies available to large firms.  
 In case managerial information of the regional firm is not 
transparent for money suppliers, the agency cost must be covered by either 
collateral assets of the borrowers or monitoring efforts of the financial 
intermediaries. The ratio of fixed assets to total assets of manufacturing 
firms is generally higher than that of the non-manufacturing firms. 
Therefore, obtaining financing resources is easier when the fixed assets 
have a high value as collateral. Literatures use this as the background of the 
relationship between manufacturing firm ratio and regional funding 
demand. 
 Generally, SMEs do not have many funding methodologies. They 
often depend on bank borrowings for their external funding. Therefore, 
funding demands in regions with a high ratio of SMEs are likely to be 
induced by a cut in interest rates. According to Bernanke (1993), Bernanke 
and Blinder (1988), and Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), the ultimate purpose of 
the central bank’s monetary policy is to influence the balance sheet of 
financial intermediaries through a change in policy interest rates. A change 
in the balance sheet of financial intermediaries ultimately influences the 
balance sheet of the borrowers. 
 Generally, the firms with various funding tools are large firms, 
which includes publicly listed firms. Most of these large firms are located in 
metropolitan areas. On the other hand, firms in regional areas are mainly 
unlisted firms and small firms. As Oliner and Rudebusch (1995) pointed 
out, bank borrowing is a main funding tool for regional firms, and this 
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funding activity is likely to be influenced by changes in interest rates. 
Although commercial banks undertake corporate credit risks, in this case, 
the easing monetary policy directly stimulates regional funding demand. 
 
C. Stability of the Regional Banking Market Sector 
 
 Another important regional factor that may influence the funding 
demand is the stability of regional banks. Researchers have suggested that 
bank stability in a region may influence borrowers’ fixed investment 
activities. This is a controversial topic among researchers in this field. 
Kashyap and Stein (1994) suggested that having large banks open up new 
regional branches would create an additional increase in commercial loans 
because the large banks generally have a high creditworthiness.3 
 We consider regional banking stability as one of the important 
factors for inducing regional funding demand. Hosono (2006) stressed the 
importance of bank stability for the regional financial intermediation. We 
also share this view. In addition to regional banking soundness, regions 
with interest rates above zero tend to have low banking competitiveness. 
As Lee and Nagano (2008) pointed out, while many regional lending 
markets are not competitive in Japan, a small number of regions are very 
competitive, and the lending rates are relatively high in these regions.  
 Basically, not many literature sources focus on the relationship 
between the regional diversification of banking market and regional 
funding demand. Hori and Kotaki (2003) and Noma (2007) discussed the 
relationship between the performance of the regional banks and the 
regional economic trends. Hori and Kotaki (2003) concluded that there 
were no statistical causalities between regional banking stability and 
regional macroeconomic performance. Alternatively, Noma (2007) 
concluded that an increase in regional commercial lending contributed to a 
growth in the industrial sector. However, neither Hori and Kotaki (2003) 
nor Noma (2007) mentioned the relationship between the diversification of 
the banking markets and the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy. 
 
3.  Testing the Hypothesis and the Equation Model 
 
 The purpose of this paper was to examine the regional factors that 
might influence the interest elasticity of funding demand in Japan. We first 
                                                  
3 In this regard, the opposite view of Moore and Hill (1982) said that more active behaviors 
of the existing regional banks were more important than new entries by large banks since 
the regional banks had long-term relationship with borrowers in the region and there were 
fewer asymmetric information problems.  
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verified the regional factors that were empirically supported by the existing 
literature. These regional factors included the ratio of manufacturing 
industries in the region and regional bank stability. Secondly, we examined 
new variables that have not been discussed in the existing literature. These 
regional factors included the private capital stock and regional banking 
competitiveness. We chose to employ these variables because we 
hypothesized that easing monetary policy is effective where the existing 
regional private capital stock is large. We also hypothesized that easing 
monetary policy was effective when high soundness and competitiveness 
of the banking market promoted the lowering of lending rates in that 
region. 
 
 
),...,,,...,,( 11 njtjtmjtjtitit ZZYYXfI =  (3.1) 
 
),...,,,( 1 njtjtjtitit ZZRIgX =   (3.2) 
 
 Here, I denotes a firm i’s fixed asset investment in year t, X is the 
firm i’s individual factor that influences the fixed asset investment in year t, 
Y denotes the factors that influence the firm’s funding demand in region j, 
R is real lending interest rate within region j, and Z denotes the factors that 
influence lending behaviors of regional banks within region j. 
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 Summarizing the above overall hypothesis of this paper, a 
decrease in interest payments improves internal funding ability, but it 
alone does not induce the firm’s fixed asset investment. When the 
necessary regional conditions are fulfilled the investment additionally 
increases. To examine the above hypotheses, this paper employed the 
following empirical equations. 
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(3.4)
 
      
ζθθθθθθ ++×++×+++= 2543210 / RIRICMPRICARRIKIDIR   
(3.5) 
Dependent and Endogenous Variables 
I/K: fixed tangible asset net increase (current year) plus depreciation expense (current 
year) divided by fixed tangible assets (previous year) of firm i 
DIR: interest payments (current year) divided by total bank loan (current year) of firm i 
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Independent Variables 
ROA: net profit (previous year) divided by total asset (previous year) of firm i 
ASSET: natural logarithm of total asset (previous year) of firm i 
DER: total debt (previous year) divided by total capital (previous year) of firm i 
STK: private regional capital stock divided by gross prefectural product in prefecture j 
where firm i’s headquarters is located 
STK × DIR: intersected variable between STK (previous year) and DIR (previous year) 
MFG: nominal gross prefectural product from manufacturing sector to gross prefectural  
product in prefecture j where firm i’s headquarters is located 
MFG × DIR: intersected variable between MFG (previous year) and DIR (previous year) 
RI: annual average of short-term prime lending rate in year t minus year on year increase 
of consumer price index in prefecture j where firm i’s headquarters is located 
CAR: weighted average of capital adequacy ratios of commercial banks registered in 
National Banker’s Association in prefecture j where firm i’s headquarters is located 
CAR × RI: intersected variable between CAR (previous year) and RI (previous year) 
CMP: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of regional bank lending outstanding in prefecture j 
where firm i’s headquarters is located 
CMP × RI: intersected variable between CMP (previous year) and RI (previous year) 
 
 
 The above equations are estimated by two-stage least squares for 
simultaneous equation models with instrumental variables. I/K and DIR 
are assumed to be determined endogenously, while the other variables are 
set as instrumental variables. All the variables are first differenced to 
eliminate the possible individual firm effects. 
 As for the private capital stock, we used Ishikawa’s (2003) 
methodology to estimate regional private capital stock. Ishikawa (2003) 
estimated values of private capital stocks of the forty-seven prefectures 
between 1980–1994. We extended these values to 2007 by using the 
following formula: 
 
tjtjtjttjtj IPpDPaSTKSTK ,,,1,, /)1( +−−×= −  (3.6)
 
 
STK: non-government capital stock in prefecture j ; DP: consumption of non-government 
fixed capital stock in prefecture j ; IP: non-government fixed capital formation in each 
prefecture j ; P: deflator of non-government fixed capital formation in prefecture j ; 
a: adjustment parameter 
 
 We calculated real values of non-government capital stock for each 
prefecture and then converted these to nominal values. The adjustment 
parameter of a was obtained from Ishikawa’s (2003) work. Our hypotheses 
expected the following positive or negative results for equation models 3.4 
and 3.5. 
 
  
Dependent Variables 
 
Demand Side: 
Fixed Asset 
Supply Side: 
Interest 
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Investment / 
Fixed Tangible 
Assets（I/K） 
 
Payments / 
Bank Loan 
(DIR) 
 
Independent Variables: 
 
Endogenous Variables 
I/K: Fixed Asset Investment / Fixed Tangible Assets 
DIR: Interest Payments / Bank Loan 
 
Instrument Variables 
ROA: Return on Assets 
ASSET: log of Total Assets 
DER: Debt to Equity Ratio 
STK*DIR: Intersected Variable between STK and DIR 
MFG*DIR: Intersected Variable between MFG and DIR 
 
RI: Real Short-term Prime Lending Rate 
CAR*RI: Intersected Variable between CAR and RI 
CMP*RI: Intersected Variable between CMP and RI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
+ 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+ 
+ 
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4. Data 
 
 Financial data of publicly unlisted firms were obtained from 
Bureau van Dijk, Inc., and the listed firms were obtained from Nikkei Data 
Co. We obtained regional characteristics data from the Cabinet Office, 
Nikkei Data Co., Nikkin Communications Inc., and Thomson Reuters Inc. 
The number of publicly unlisted samples was 18,187 and that of the listed 
firms was 3,820. Firms within the financial sector as well as real estate 
businesses were excluded from the samples. The number of the samples 
from the 47 prefectures is provided in Appendix A. 
 The regional bank data were obtained from Nikkei NEEDs Data 
Co. We obtained capital adequacy ratio, total assets, and other necessary 
data that represent regional banking stability and competitiveness from the 
regional bank data. Data from Nikkin Communications Inc. was also 
included in the regional bank data. This data was necessary because the 
lending data of regional banks from Nikkei NEEDs included data from 
both inside and outside the region of each bank’s headquarters. We needed 
to employ lending data inside the prefecture.  
 Regional macroeconomic variables such as the private capital stock 
to nominal gross prefectural product (GPP) and the ratio of manufacturing 
sector GPP to total GPP were obtained from the Cabinet Office. Historically, 
these data have been provided by the respective regions. We prepared a 
panel dataset by merging the data of the above individual firm’s financial 
and regional characteristics in 2001–2007. 
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5. Empirical Analyses 
 
5. 1 Analysis of Regional Unlisted Firms 
 
 According to the Establishment and Enterprise Census of the 
Japanese Ministry of Affairs and Communications, unlisted firms account 
for more than 99% of the total number of enterprises in Japan. This 
suggests that regional industrial sectors mainly comprise of unlisted firms, 
especially SMEs. On the basis of this background, our first empirical 
analysis focused on publicly unlisted firms by employing the equation 
models discussed in section 3. 
 As explained in the preceding section, we employed the two-stage 
least squares for simultaneous equation model for this empirical analyses. 
Variables are first differenced in this analysis. The SIC code of 
manufacturing firms are 2000–3999, while that of non-manufacturing firms 
are 4000–8999 and excludes financial and real estate industries, whose SIC 
codes are 6000–6799. Industrial dummies are added based on the two-digit 
SIC codes. Year dummies are also added. 
 The empirical results are reported in Table 1. In case of unlisted 
manufacturing firm samples—model (A)—the parameter of interest 
payments to total bank loan (DIR) was insignificant but that of intersected 
variable between private capital stock (STK) and DIR was negatively 
significant. The parameter of intersected variables between manufacturing 
industry ratio (MFG) and DIR was also negatively significant. Alternatively, 
when the dependent variable is DIR, the parameter of intersected variables 
between the bank’s capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and prime lending rate 
(RI) was positively significant. The intersection of variables between the 
bank’s competitiveness (CMP) and RI was also positively significant. 
 Our hypotheses were also supported in the case of unlisted 
non-manufacturing firm samples—model (B). The parameter of the 
intersected variable between STK and DIR was negatively significant, but 
the parameter of intersected variables between MFG and DIR was 
insignificant. The parameter of intersected variables between CAR and RI 
was positively significant, while the intersection of the variable between 
CMP and RI was insignificant. 
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Table. 1 Regional Factors that Influence Regional Funding Demand: Unlisted 
Firms 
 
Notes:  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of confidence, respectively. 
 
 
5. 2 Analysis of Regional Listed Firms 
 
 The empirical results of listed firms are shown in Table 2, and they 
(A) Manufacturing Firms (a) Dep. Var.= I/K (b) Dep. Var.= DIR
Est: First-Differenced Est: First-Differenced 
Endogenous Variable
 DIR 0.167 (1.170)
 I/K -0.260 *** (-18.450)
Instruments Variables
 ROA -0.749 *** (-4.730)
 ASSET 1.725 *** (27.260)
 DER -0.819 (0.374)
 DIR*STK -2.862 ** (-2.470)
 DRI*MFG -0.129 (-1.110)
 DIR^2 -0.232 ** (-2.080)
 RI 1.226 ** (2.550)
 RI*CAR 0.063 * (1.930)
 RI*CMP 0.028 *** (4.750)
 RI^2 0.139 ** (2.420)
 Year Dummies yes yes
 Industrial Dummies yes yes
 Const 0.164 *** (7.460) 0.186 *** (19.130)
Wald Chi2 1,562.14 *** 654.9 ***
Observations 19,205 19,205
Firms 8,196 8,196
R-squared 0.032 0.007
(B) Non-Manufacturing Firms (a) Dep. Var.= I/K (b) Dep. Var.= DIR
Est: First-Differenced Est: First-Differenced 
Endogenous Variable
 DIR -1.114 (-0.924)
 I/K -2.769 *** (-11.280)
Instruments Variables
 ROA -0.306 (-0.920)
 ASSET 1.503 *** (12.490)
 DER -0.571 *** (-3.140)
 DIR*STK -1.237 * (-1.840)
 DRI*MFG -0.257 (-0.840)
 DIR^2 -3.966 ** (-4.860)
 RI 2.337 *** (3.870)
 RI*CAR -0.143 (-0.480)
 RI*CMP 0.787 *** (3.600)
 RI^2 0.139 ** (2.420)
 Year Dummies yes yes
 Industrial Dummies yes yes
 Const -0.167 *** (-6.180) 1.122 (0.650)
Wald Chi2 230.90 *** 130.9 ***
Observations 9,991 9,991
Firms 5,690 5,690
R-squared 0.003 0.008
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suggest that our hypotheses are entirely supported, empirically. First, 
parameters for the intersected variables between STK and DIR were 
significantly negative when the dependent variable was fixed asset 
investment (I/K). The parameter of intersected variables between the CAR 
and RI was also positively significant when the dependent variable was 
DIR. These results are common both in manufacturing firm samples and 
non-manufacturing firm samples. 
 The chief differences between the results of listed and unlisted 
firms are that parameters for the intersected variables between MFG and 
DIR were insignificant in the case of the listed firm samples. The parameter 
of the intersected variables between the CMP and RI was also insignificant. 
We assume this to imply that the regional distribution of the listed firms is 
different from that of unlisted firms. In other words, more listed firms 
concentrate in the Tokyo metropolitan area where manufacturing 
industrial ratio is relatively low and the degree of banking competitiveness 
is high.  
 We also employed the two-stage least squares for simultaneous 
equation model for these empirical analyses. Variables are first differenced 
in this analysis. The Tokyo Stock Exchange Industrial Code for 
manufacturing firms is 3050–3800 and that for non-manufacturing firm is 
4050–6100, which excludes financial and real estate industries. Industrial 
dummies are added based on the four-digit Tokyo Stock Exchange 
Industrial Code. Year dummies for 2001–2006 are added as well.  
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Table. 2  Regional Factors that Influence Regional Funding Demand: Listed 
Firms 
 
Notes: ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of confidence, respectively. 
 
 
5. 3 Re-Examination of Interest Elasticity of Funding Demand 
 
(A) Manufacturing Firms (a) Dep. Var.= I/K (b) Dep. Var.= DIR
Est: First-Differenced Est: First-Differenced 
Endogenous Variable
 DIR 0.383 (0.780)
 I/K -0.729 *** (-21.040)
Instruments Variables
 ROA -0.464 *** (-2.740)
 ASSET 1.374 *** (21.270)
 DER 0.385 *** (5.400)
 DIR*STK -0.131 * (-1.750)
 DIR*MFG -0.088 (-1.100)
 DIR^2 1.370 * (1.910)
 RI 1.889 (0.750)
 RI*CAR 0.055 * (1.830)
 RI*CMP -0.008 (-0.680)
 RI^2 0.146 (0.830)
 Year Dummies yes yes
 Industrial Dummies yes yes
 Const -0.095 *** (-8.520) -0.100 (-10.530)
Wald Chi2 725.62 *** 478.7 ***
Observations 12,054 120,584
Firms 2,576 2,576
R-squared 0.008 0.007
(B) Non-Manufacturing Firms (a) Dep. Var.= I/K (b) Dep. Var.= DIR
Est: First-Differenced Est: First-Differenced 
Endogenous Variable
 DIR 0.512 (0.340)
 I/K -1.011 *** (-14.290)
Instruments Variables
 ROA -0.529 ** (-2.440)
 ASSET 0.857 *** (12.650)
 DER -0.442 *** (-3.400)
 DIR*STK -0.491 ** (-2.270)
 DIR*MFG 0.183 (0.250)
 DIR^2 1.370 (-0.640)
 RI 1.736 (0.160)
 RI*CAR 0.361 * (1.730)
 RI*CMP 0.163 (0.081)
 RI^2 0.001 (0.680)
 Year Dummies yes yes
 Industrial Dummies yes yes
 Const -0.183 *** (-8.280) -0.155 *** (-4.460)
Wald Chi2 241.64 *** 212.7 ***
Observations 5,982 5,982
Firms 1,244 1,244
R-squared 0.093 0.005
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 Empirical results of the previous two sections completely support 
our hypotheses that industry agglomeration and high banking soundness 
are two necessary conditions to induce the fixed asset investment demand 
under monetary easing conditions. This section reexamines the empirical 
tests to confirm if the results are common when it is verified using 
individual firm data, by region. We estimated the interest elasticity of 
funding demands once again according to prefecture. Although we 
estimated these elasticities in sections 5.1–5.2, this section estimates them as 
per region. We employed the following empirical model. 
 
ψωωω ++++= ASSETROAITRconstKI 321/   (5. 1) 
 
I/K: Fixed tangible asset net increase (current year) plus depreciation expense (current 
year) divided by fixed tangible assets (previous year) of firm i 
ITR: Interest payments (previous year) divided by total bank loan (previous year) of firm i 
ROA: Net profit (previous year) divided by total Assets (previous year) of firm i 
ASSET: Total asset (previous year) of firm i 
 
 The concept of the above equation is based on that of (3.1). 
However, variables of industry agglomeration and high banking market 
competition are common; that is, this micro data analysis uses only one 
data respective to each prefecture. Therefore, we first estimated (5. 1) for 
forty-seven prefectures and compared elasticities between the regions 
having high industry agglomeration and banking market competition and 
the others. 
 All the variables except ROA are converted to natural logarithm. 
We regard the parameter of ITR as interest elasticity of funding demand. 
First, we prepared the dataset of the sample firms of the forty-seven 
prefectures and estimated the above equation with fixed effect and random 
effect estimations. We reported either based on the information obtained 
from Hausman Specification Test and Breush Pagan LM Test in Table 3. 
The sample period is 2003–2008. The firm data are obtained from Bureau 
van Dijk, Inc. and the estimation uses data from unlisted firms. 
Independent variables other than ITR are employed in order to eliminate 
the influence from the internal funding ability and scale effect. Since the 
ratio of manufacturing industries in a region might influence the regional 
funding demand, five industrial dummies are added. 
 To compare interest elasticities of the funding demand between 
regions having high private capital stock and banking market competition 
and the others, we calculate, in advance, the deviation scores of private 
capital stock per capita and banking market Herfindahl–Hirshman Index, 
by region. Then, we compare the values of interest elasticity of demand 
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between the region having high and low deviation scores. Each deviation 
score is shown in Appendix C. 
 The results are generally consistent with those in 3.1–3.2. Nine 
prefectures in the top ten deviation score regions have shown that the 
interest elasticities of funding demand are significant, while two 
prefectures in the lowest ten score prefectures recorded significance. The 
point estimate values and the 95 percent confidence interval are also 
generally high in the top 10 deviation score prefectures. Tokyo is the only 
exception among the top 10 regions. We believe that this result originates 
from the diversification of corporate funding in this region—i.e., the trend 
of direct financing. 
 
Table. 3   Interest Elasticity of Funding Demand Estimated by Individual 
Firm Data of 2003–2008 
 
(A) Top Ten Prefectures in Regional Deviation Value of Private Capital Stock and 
Banking Market HHI 
 
Notes:   
1. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of confidence, respectively. 
2. The first and second rows under “(b) 95% Conf. Interval.” are the lower and upper bound 
of the interval estimators, respectively. 
3. The top rows under “(g) Firms and Observations” are the number of sample firms and the 
lower rows indicate the number of observations.  
 
(B) Ten Lowest Prefectures in Regional Deviation Value of Private Capital Stock 
and Banking Market HHI 
Aichi -0.0764 * -0.1570 1.0673 *** 0.2687 ***  Industry-yes Fixed 4,222
(0.0411) 0.0042 (0.0701) (0.1005)  Year-yes 8,225
Tokyo -0.0572 -0.1339 0.3563 0.9227 ***  Industry-yes Fixed 5,116
(0.0391) 0.0194 (0.3687) (0.0929)  Year-yes 9,965
Shizuoka -0.1075 *** -0.1333 0.3597 *** 0.0890 ***  Industry-yes Random 3,360
(0.0132) -0.0817 (0.1160) (0.0136)  Year-yes 7,599
Hiroshima -0.1452 * -0.2999 0.6144 1.3777 ***  Industry-yes Fixed 2,398
(0.0789) 0.0095 (0.4773) (0.1582)  Year-yes 4,464
Kanagawa -0.1519 *** -0.2299 0.2388 0.5970 ***  Industry-yes Fixed 3,112
(0.0398) -0.0739 (0.3026) (0.0881)  Year-yes 7,949
Osaka -0.1057 ** -0.1933 0.5542 1.2698 ***  Industry-yes Fixed 4,993
(0.0447) -0.0181 (0.4929) (0.1036)  Year-yes 9,380
Hyogo -0.1404 *** -0.1956 1.6395 *** -0.1310 ***  Industry-yes Random 2,049
(0.0207) -0.0853 (0.3841) (0.0207)  Year-yes 3,804
Shiga -0.0776 * -0.1586 0.7258 * -0.1030 ***  Industry-yes Random 742
(0.0413) 0.0035 (0.3819) (0.0313)  Year-yes 1,831
Ibaragi -0.0540 ** -0.1078 -0.1505 0.0587 **  Industry-yes Fixed 869
(0.0272) -0.0014 (0.2994) (0.0262)  Year-yes 3,574
Kyoto -0.0690 ** -0.1313 0.1229 0.5038 ***  Industry-yes Fixed 1,487
(0.0318) -0.0067 (0.2686) (0.0234)  Year-yes 3,614
(f)Estimation
(g) Firms &
Observations
(a)ITR
(b)95%
Conf.Interval.
(c)ROA (d)SIZE (e)Dummies
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Notes:   
1. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of confidence, respectively. 
2. The first and second rows under “(b) 95% Conf. Interval.” are the lower and upper 
bounds of the interval estimators, respectively. 
3. The top rows of “(g) Firms and Observations” are the number of sample firms, and that 
below is the number of observations. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
 This paper addressed the demand of firm funding in an 
environment of increasing regional diversification of the funding market in 
Japan. The lending markets in metropolitan areas are different from those 
in smaller cities; this is because metropolitan areas have a larger number of 
publicly listed firms. The markets in local cities are also heterogeneous and 
diversified. This paper has empirically shown what has created new 
additional regional funding demand and what has not in the diversified 
banking markets. On the basis of our empirical studies, we found that 
developing industrial agglomerations and enhancing the stability of 
banking sectors in lending markets were necessary requirements. 
 One of the most important results in this paper is that funding 
demand depends on the degree of industrial agglomerations in the regional 
economy. Particularly in the case of publicly unlisted firms, we found that 
the intersection of private capital stock with borrowing rates significantly 
influenced the regional fixed asset investment. Therefore, the role of the 
capital stock is evidently important in stimulating the demand for 
corporate funding in regions. These empirical analyses suggest that the 
high degree of industrial agglomerations is a required condition toward 
achieving policy goals. 
 Another important result in this paper is that our hypotheses on 
Tokushima -0.1012 -0.2723 0.2524 1.1028 ***  Industry-yes Fixed 699
(0.0872) 0.0698 (0.8146) (0.2038)  Year-yes 1,877
Miyazaki -0.1540 -0.3869 -0.8673 1.2653 ***  Industry-yes Random 812
(0.1187) 0.0790 (0.7519) (0.1926)  Year-yes 2,043
Hokkaido 0.0530 -0.0279 -0.1691 1.3235 ***  Industry-yes Fixed 5,420
(0.0413) 0.1339 (0.3218) (0.1221)  Year-yes 8,998
Iwate -0.1102 ** -0.2053 0.2518 0.4598 ***  Industry-yes Fixed 1,541
(0.0485) -0.0151 (0.2964) (0.1441)  Year-yes 3,555
Kochi -0.0034 -0.1530 0.6671 0.8176 ***  Industry-yes Fixed 634
(0.0762) 0.1462 (0.9623) (0.2189)  Year-yes 1,573
Shimane -0.0383 -0.2503 -0.4859 0.9894 ***  Industry-yes Fixed 863
(0.0779) 0.1736 (0.6068) (0.1973)  Year-yes 2,173
Kumamoto -0.0883 -0.2376 0.1584 0.7907 ***  Industry-yes Fixed 1,168
(0.0761) 0.0610 (0.7941) (0.1878)  Year-yes 2,596
Saga -0.2253 -0.4442 -3.1172 *** 1.3404 ***  Industry-yes Fixed 507
(0.2105) 0.0831 (1.1239) (0.2656)  Year-yes 1,080
Okinawa -0.1003 -0.2220 1.5433 * 0.4155 ***  Industry-yes Fixed 1,178
(0.0620) 0.0214 (0.9215) (0.1592)  Year-yes 2,770
Nara -0.2792 *** -0.4377 0.9716 ** 0.5677 ***  Industry-yes Fixed 645
(0.0808) -0.1208 (0.8649) (0.1843)  Year-yes 1,780
(f)Estimation
(g) Firms &
Observations
(a)ITR
(b)95%
Conf.Interval.
(c)ROA (d)SIZE (e)Dummies
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the relationship between regional banking market stability and the funding 
demand in a region were also supported. We statistically found that very 
sound banking markets had lower interest rates of debt and that the 
parameter of intersected variable between the variable and prime lending 
rate and banking stability is significant to the interest rate of the bank loan. 
Therefore, lowering policy interest coupled with the banking soundness 
influences the interest elasticity of demand of borrowers. However, 
according to the empirical results, an improvement in the internal funding 
ability—i.e., ROA—for the firm did not relate to the proxy of external 
funding demand—i.e., fixed asset investment increase. It is our belief that 
corporate return on assets is generally influenced by the business 
performance itself and that the level of the policy interest rate is not an 
important factor in determining external funding demands. 
 On the basis of the above empirical results, we derived the 
following conclusions. The regional diversified interest elasticity of funding 
demand depends on the degree of industrial agglomerations and the 
banking market stability across the regions. This means that in order to 
stimulate the regional funding demand, appropriate industrial policies and 
banking supervision in the regions are necessary. In other words, factors 
that increase the interest elasticity of funding demand are on both the 
demand and supply side of the regional money funding market. 
 A good example that supports the conclusions drawn in this paper 
is that well-performing regional banks recorded good financial results in 
2009. The Bank of Yokohama Ltd., Chiba Bank Ltd., Hiroshima Bank Ltd., 
Shizuoka Bank Ltd., and Suruga Bank Ltd. are examples of these well 
performing banks. The headquarters for all of these banks are located in the 
regions where industrial agglomerations have historically progressed. 
Since the capital stock of manufacturing industries has increased in each 
region, the number of households and the population has also increased. In 
these regions, banking market competition has also been promoted because 
outsiders (i.e., banks from the Tokyo area and neighboring prefectures) 
have participated in the market. In these areas, competitive market 
environments have forced poor performing regional banks to exit from the 
markets. As a result, the existing regional banks are highly efficient and 
competitive. 
 This paper employed new additional variables to explain the 
determinants of regional diversification of funding demand. Accumulated 
private capital stock as a proxy for industrial agglomerations is one of these 
variables. This variable is also influenced by the size of public capital stock, 
but this paper did not verify the relationship between industrial 
agglomerations and the size of public capital stock. We have concluded 
that multiple requirements are needed to increase regional funding 
18 
 
demand. Future studies should examine how the public sector performs 
contributes to regional funding demand. 
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Appendix A: The Number of Samples and the Descriptive Statistics 
 
 The following statistics are the number of firms employed for the 
empirical analyses. Descriptive statistics in Table A2 are for all sample periods.  
 
Table A1 Number of Sample Firms by Prefecture 
 
Note: As the variables are first differenced, the empirical analysis for the firms in 
sections 5.1 and 5.2 are not consistent with the numbers in the above samples. 
 
Unlisted Firms Listed Firms Unlisted Firms Listed Firms
Hokkaido 8,317 49 Shiga 755 11
Aomori 1,648 1 Kyoto 916 79
Iwate 1,619 3 Osaka 6,760 557
Miyagi 2,784 17 Hyogo 3,105 146
Akita 819 3 Nara 687 7
Yamagata 1,595 3 Wakayama 601 7
Fukushima 1,863 8
Tottori 650 3
Ibaragi 797 17 Shimane 896 4
Tochigi 1,087 10 Okayama 1,494 17
Gunma 1,109 18 Hiroshima 4,167 44
Saitama 1,930 56 Yamaguchi 903 16
Chiba 2,724 34
Tokyo 13,870 1,790 Tokushima 788 1
Kanagawa 3,058 182 Kagawa 1,233 19
Ehime 2,049 10
Niigata 3,322 30 Kochi 661 5
Toyama 1,320 25
Ishikawa 2,576 24 Fukuoka 6,320 77
Fukui 1,368 11 Saga 590 3
Yamanashi 574 6 Nagasaki 1,472 5
Nagano 2,598 25 Kumamoto 1,942 7
Gifu 1,446 26 Oita 2,092 6
Shizuoka 5,067 49 Miyazaki 878 3
Aichi 6,258 212 Kagoshima 1,279 7
Mie 1,199 15 Okinawa 2,178 4
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Table A2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Deviation Scores of Private Capital Stock per Capita and 
Banking Market Herfindahl–Hirshman Index 
 
 We estimated the interest elasticity of funding demand of twenty 
prefectures with firm individual data of 2003–2006. The prefectures are chosen on 
the basis of the total deviation scores given below of the private capital stock per 
capita and the banking market HHI. 
 
Mean Stv Max Min
I/K
Unlisted Firms -1.489 1.402 6.404 -13.453
Listed Firms -2.093 1.391 4.430 -10.079
DIR
Unlisted Firms -4.638 1.047 0.574 -13.994
Listed Firms -5.129 1.141 2.890 -12.080
ROA
Unlisted Firms 0.022 0.099 8.534 -5.343
Listed Firms 0.045 0.124 0.657 -11.472
DER
Unlisted Firms -0.365 0.430 3.783 -6.998
Listed Firms -0.702 0.544 5.957 -7.919
ASSET
Unlisted Firms 8.361 1.500 15.040 1.380
Listed Firms 10.600 1.730 17.299 3.466
MFG
Regional Data 0.220 0.081 0.420 0.041
STK
Regional Data 1.921 0.225 2.521 1.123
RI
Regional Data 0.029 0.005 0.046 0.009
CAR
Regional Data 8.672 3.014 14.870 0.654
CMP
Regional Data 0.231 0.130 0.612 0.005
nominal gross prefectural product from manufacturing sector to gross prefectural product
(current year)
natural logarithm of fixed tangible asset net increase (current year) plus depreciation
expense (current year) divided by fixed tangible assets (previous year) of firm i
natural logatithm of interest payments (current year) divided by bank loan of firm i
net profit (previous year) divided by total assets (previous year) of firm i
natural logarithm of total debt (prevous year) divided by total capital (previous year) of
firm i
natural logarithm of total assets (prevous year) of firm i
private regional capital stock divided by gross prefectural product in each prefecture
(current year)
real short-term prime lending rate in each prefecture (current year)
weighted average of capital adequacy ratios of commercial banks registered in National
Banker’s Association in each prefecture where the banks eadquarter, book value of total
assets are used for the weight (current year)
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of regional bank lending outstanding in each prefecture
(current year)
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Table B.  The top 10 and the lowest 10 Deviation Scores of Private Capital 
Stock per Capita and Banking Market Herfindahl-Hirshman Index 
 
Note: The above deviation scores are calculated by using averaged data of private 
capital stock per capita and banking market HHI in 1999–2006 by prefecture. 
1) Private Capital Stock
divided by Population
2) HHI in Banking
Market
3) Total
1 Aichi 75.3 74.8 150.1
2 Tokyo 96.1 51.1 147.2
3 Shizuoka 84.6 44.9 129.5
4 Hiroshima 61.9 58.2 120.1
5 Kanagawa 46.5 71.7 118.3
6 Osaka 47.3 69.6 116.8
7 Hyogo 46.5 62.9 109.4
8 Shiga 46.5 61.4 107.9
9 Ibaragi 47.0 60.9 107.9
10 Kyoto 47.0 60.6 107.7
38 Tokushima 45.1 46.3 91.4
39 Miyazaki 44.8 46.5 91.3
40 Hokkaido 38.3 51.8 90.1
41 Iwate 42.5 46.9 89.3
42 Kochi 40.9 47.2 88.1
43 Shimane 39.8 46.7 86.5
44 Kumamoto 38.5 46.4 84.9
45 Saga 36.8 47.0 83.7
46 Okinawa 35.7 46.0 81.7
47 Nara 33.5 46.6 80.1
